This document was produced by MAFF as a specific response to the FMD outbreak in the UK in 2001 and was made available on their website. Risk Assessments and specific recommendations related to the conditions in the field at the time and should be viewed in this context as they may not be applicable to outbreaks occuring under different circumstances.
Foot and mouth disease
27 March 2001

MAFF: Veterinary Risk Assessment No.1: the risk of causing new outbreaks of FMD by moving livestock directly from "Farm A" to "Farm B"?

1. SUMMARY OF RISK ASSESSMENT - MAJOR RISK FACTORS

Moving livestock during an FMD outbreak increases the risk of spreading infection to premises which were previously uninfected. The greatest risk is to the premises of destination. There are lower risks to the premises of origin and possibly even lower risks to premises passed during the journey. The factors considered to be most responsible for increasing the risk are:

• Failure to detect FMD infection at premises of origin (farm A)
• Failure to take account of recent history of all animals at the premises of origin
• Failure to take account of recent history of animal transport vehicle and equipment
• Lack of awareness of appropriate hygienic precautions
• Failure to disinfect vehicles and equipment
• Failure to quarantine animals following suspected contact with FMDV
• Failure to quarantine personnel following suspected contact with FMDV
• Failure to minimise distance, time travelled, and stopping points on route
• Movement of livestock or vehicles from infected areas to apparently unaffected areas
• Movement of animals between places by walking, especially in a infected area and, of much less significance
• Close proximity of an infected premises to route/journey

2. SUMMARY OF RISK MANAGEMENT OPTIONS

Many risks are already prevented or minimised by statute - e.g. controls on Form A and Form D premises, and requirements for livestock vehicle cleansing and disinfection and record keeping. These are assumed to be observed and are not repeated here.

Risk management procedures can be applied at the farm of origin, en route, and at the farm of destination. They are listed separately:

1. Ensure that the vehicle which will move stock is clean and has been disinfected before collection, and that driver wears clean, disinfected protective clothing
2. Licence movements only on farmers own vehicle (whether vendor or recipient).
3. Allow movement only if there has been no movement of susceptible livestock onto farm in period to be specified (suggest 21 days)
4. Inspect before movement to ensure no clinical signs of FMD in stock to be moved, or in other stock on premises. Inspection by (in decreasing order of effectiveness):
1. Veterinary surgeon
2. Other official
3. Farmer
4. Time limit licence to shortest practical period after inspection of stock

1. Require direct movement
2. Prohibit multiple collections or deliveries
3. Prevent movement within 3km of IP
4. Prevent movement through infected area, even by motorway
5. Prevent movements from controlled to infected area (converse unacceptable in any circumstances)
6. Apart from movements between parts of the same farm, where animals are to be transported not walked

C. At farm of destination

i. Detain animals for 21 days after arrival for observation. Observation by veterinary surgeon, other official or owner in decreasing order of effectiveness. Sheep could be sampled for serology whilst detained, to monitor the effectiveness of the controls.

ii. Allow no movement of any livestock from farm. Other than to slaughter for specified period (i.e. as A(ii)).

iii. Require cleansing and disinfection of vehicle as soon as possible after use and before being used again (at farm if facilities there). Require driver to cleanse and disinfect boots and clothing before leaving farm.

The options suggested can be included, in whole or part, in a licensing system. Because licences are issued by the local authority responsible for the destination, it is suggested that a licence using local authority and owner declaration input be used (as for stock for slaughter under new arrangements).

3. RECOMMENDED ACTION

i. Movement of livestock from one premises to another does carry a risk that FMD will be spread to previously uninfected premises. However, a no-movement policy cannot be enforced indefinitely without seriously prejudicing animal welfare.

ii. The risk can be minimised by restricting movements to those which are essential to protect animal welfare, by requiring veterinary inspection before movement, and by allowing movement only under licence and subject to the conditions of the licence. Conditions which may be specified are listed at 3A-C above.

iii. Risk can be further reduced by allowing only movements which originate from premises in a Controlled Area or, if movement from other areas is permitted, prohibiting movement from a higher to a lower risk area (e.g.no movement permitted from an Infected to a Controlled Area).

iv. Subject to these safeguards, movement of livestock from one farm to another can be permitted. It would be appropriate to restrict such movements to those needed to protect animal welfare initially, with a more liberal regime being introduced as the disease situation improves.

Contributors:
R Jones Risk Research Dept, VLA, Weybridge
C T Livesey Risk Research Dept, VLA, Weybridge
D MacKay VMD, Weybridge and formerly IAH Pirbright Laboratory
KC Taylor Veterinary Consultant
Dr M Wooldridge Head of Risk Research Dept, VLA, Weybridge

16th March 2001